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Regional Business Networks and the  
Multinational Retail Sector 
ABSTRACT 
In this paper we examine the network relationships of a set of large retail 
multinational enterprises (MNEs). We analyze under what conditions a flagship-
network strategy (characterized by a network of five partners – the MNE; key 
suppliers; key partners; selected competitors; and key organisations in the non-
business infrastructure) explains the internationalisation of three retailers whose 
geographic scope, sectoral conditions and competitive strategies differ substantially. 
We explore why and when retailers will adopt a flagship strategy. The three firms are 
Tesco and The Body Shop, two U.K.-based multinational retailers, and Moët 
Hennessy Louis Vuitton (LVMH), a French-based global retailer. We find evidence 
of strong network relationships for all three retailers, yet they embrace network 
strategies for different reasons. Their flagship relationships depend on each retailer’s 
strategic use of firm-specific-advantages (FSAs) and country-specific advantages 
(CSAs). We find that a flagship strategy succeeds in overcoming internal and/or 
environmental constraints to cross-border resource transfers, which are barriers to 
foreign direct investment (FDI). We provide recommendations on why and when to 
use a flagship-based strategy and which type of network partners to prioritize in order 
to succeed internationally. 
 
Keywords:  international retailing; flagship strategy; networks; LVMH; Tesco; The 
Body Shop; multinational; firm-specific advantages; regional strategy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is well known that the retail industry is one of the least internationalised among 
leading economic sectors. Indeed, in 2000, the world’s top twenty retailers held no 
more than 26% of their assets overseas. In contrast, foreign assets accounted for 78% 
of tobacco manufacturers’ total assets, 50% of chemical multinationals’ total assets, 
and 40% of pharmaceutical companies’ total assets
1. This reflects the highly specific 
constraints on the transfer of retailers’ capabilities across national borders. These 
constraints persist in spite of the opportunities offered to retailers for 
internationalisation by increasing regional economic integration in North America, 
Europe and Asia
2. Slow sectoral internationalisation coupled with the recent 
remarkable international achievements of a few retailers has renewed interest in 
international retailing
3.  
  In retailing, sometimes more than in manufacturing, internationalisation is not 
risk free, as the frequently discussed troubles of Wal-Mart and Toys R Us in Europe, 
Royal Ahold in the United States, and Carrefour in China have highlighted
4. Retailers 
have two major strategic choices in internationalisation. First, they can transfer their 
resources by creating a proprietary network of foreign subsidiaries, i.e. through 
foreign direct investment (FDI). This strategy involves either greenfield development 
strategies (the firm sets up its operations from scratch), or acquisitions of existing 
local players or a combination of both. In this article we call this an internalisation 
strategy
5 . Alternatively, to limit their capital and physical exposure, retailers can 
internationalise by building networks with local and regional partners, such as key 
suppliers, key retail partners, key competitors and non-business infrastructure 
organisations that perform different value added activities in partnership with the  
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retailer. We call this alternative a flagship-network strategy
6. Here, we focus on the 
latter.  
  Our research takes an exploratory case study approach to investigate to what 
extent and in which circumstances retailers will rely on a flagship strategy to 
overcome their resource and capability transfer limits, to reduce their liability of 
foreignness, and to sustain internationalisation
7. The cases investigated are Tesco, 
Moët Hennessy Louis Vuitton (LVMH) and The Body Shop, selected for their 
important strategy positioning and sectoral differences.  
Across the three retailers we find evidence of successful internationalisation 
correlated with the implementation of a flagship strategy. Yet they embrace a flagship 
strategy in different degrees and for different reasons. These differences depend on 
the transferability of their resources and capabilities and on their use of country-
specific advantages (CSAs). We find that, contingent on these dimensions, a flagship 
strategy based on long-term collaboration and learning with network partners is the 
best strategy to overcome internal and/or environmental constraints to cross-border 
resource transfers, which are barriers to FDI. We highlight the managerial 
implications of these findings. 
 
THE FLAGSHIP SRATEGY 
We investigate when and why retailers will opt for a flagship internationalisation 
strategy. We propose that MNEs facing internal and environmental constraints to 
their internationalisation—i.e. some limits to the transfer of their competencies across 
border—are better off entering certain foreign markets by building networks of local 
and regional key partners than by adopting a go-it-alone FDI strategy. Among the 
multiple “network” configurations described in the literature, the flagship strategy  
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alone highlights the benefits of a corporate-planned, long-term based 
internationalisation strategy which involves one central multinational and a web of 
selected partners. In contrast with many studies which highlight bilateral relationships 
in retailing
8, the flagship goes a step further by enabling firms to leverage 
multidirectional network effects.     
 Figure  1 presents the flagship-network five partners framework. The rationale 
for the MNE to develop a flagship strategy is to reduce uncertainty while 
internationalising and increasing learning. The first member is the network’s strategic 
centre, i.e. the MNE which acts as a flagship in terms of strategic control and 
direction for the entire network. The MNE relies on four types of cross-border 
partners to increase its international expansion rather than on bureaucratic vertical 
integration.  
FIGURE 1 here 
Key suppliers are those whose inputs are critical to the development of the 
flagship’s competitive advantage. The flagship recognises in them the ability to 
produce value added inputs and services in an efficient manner. Key customers are 
businesses specialising in distribution and intermediation with final consumers. The 
non-business infrastructure (NBI) is made up of non-profit organisations that are 
relevant to the flagship firm’s competitiveness across borders. These partners can be 
government agencies, universities, research centres or trade associations. Finally, key 
competitors are those firms that the flagship may select to form alliances of joint 
ventures in the cases where the economic risks to be borne are greater than one party 
alone can support.  
The flagship MNE provides the strategic vision and coordination to lead the 
network through successful international expansion. All five partners interact freely 
and openly with each other and the complementarities of skills necessary to improve  
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the overall network performance are coordinated by the flagship through a multi-
directional information flow. Although the upstream and downstream partners, the 
key distributors and the key suppliers relinquish strategic direction to the flagship 
(strategic asymmetry), they gain additional decentralised value-added activities of 
their own. All relationships are long-term and knowledge-sharing agreements. Key 
partners specialize in achieving commonly agreed tasks. Relationships with key 
suppliers rely on international benchmarking rather than on competitive tendering.  
  All these traits make the flagship strategy quite distinct from other network 
strategies in the literature. While some network studies focus on social relations 
between individuals and organisations but without any specific strategic intent and 
others have a strategic management purpose, few address international business 
issues. To recognize the contribution of flagship strategy to the international 
management field, it is important to differentiate the flagship framework from 
multiple and heterogeneous definitions of networks.  
  As underscored in Table 1 which contrasts these different views with the 
flagship, sociological accounts of networks either emphasise the network landscape in 
which firms are broadly embedded (see Nohria’s work for instance
9), or inter-
personal networks where the structure and the nature of ties between individuals is 
the object of study (see for example Burt’s or Krackhardt’s developments
10). These 
views have only indirectly emphasised the benefits of networks for firms’ innovation, 
competitive advantage creation, and learning.  
  In contrast, the strategic management stream to which the flagship strategy 
belongs emphasises strategic networks geared toward innovation, flexibility, learning, 
and capability development. This work models firms as internal networks, such as the 
‘heterarchy’ (proposed by Hedlund
11), and the ‘differentiated network’ by Nohria and  
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Ghoshal
12. Yet they have focused on the intra-organisational level. At the inter-
organisational level Lorenzoni and Baden-Fuller’s ‘strategic centre’ is the closest to 
the flagship concept since it stresses the role of one lean firm, the strategic centre
13 
which coordinates a web of multiple partners, both upstream and upstream to share 
risks, innovate and gain flexibility. However, this configuration, and others,
14 are not 
internationally oriented. They neglect one crucial challenge facing managers 
contemplating internationalisation: how to overcome barriers to FDI when the firm 
has limitedly geographically transferable capabilities (i.e. when it lacks the 
capabilities needed to operate in foreign markets, and/or when host-environments are 
hostile.)  
  The Håkanson and Johansson’s framework does consider these 
internationalisation challenges (in addition to innovation-enhancement), but in 
contrast with the flagship, Håkanson and Johansson’s ‘industrial networks’
15 do not 
feature a strategically leading multinational firm that acts as a strategic centre for all 
the partners. Instead, their network configuration consists of several strategic centres 
and peripheral firms such that they emphasise power rivalries between different sub-
networks. In the flagship strategy, however, no partner is the rival of the others, 
which limits political clashes. The flagship strategy is also distinct from typologies of 
locally based clusters of cooperative firms (Porter) which can also cooperate across 
geographic boundaries (Nachum and Keeble) but which are analyzed at an aggregated 
industry level, and therefore make the benefits for each firm difficult to disentangle
16. 
  In addition to its specific focus on MNEs’ strategy, a flagship strategy 
presents two other distinct features. First, the flagship network relies on ‘strategic 
asymmetry’ between the flagship MNE and its partners. Strategic asymmetry is the 
network’s key governance mechanism to curb the risk of opportunism incurred by  
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coordination outside the hierarchy. While most studies emphasise the common 
participation of all partners to strategy, in the flagship strategy, independent partners 
relinquish the strategic leadership of the network to the central MNE for those 
activities relevant to the network’s scope. Indeed, strategic asymmetry increases the 
network stability through shared inter-organisational purpose based on a constant 
agreement on a well-defined strategic agenda. If all partners participated in strategy 
formulation, competing objectives between partners would undermine trust and 
shared purpose. It also helps the development of a ‘common language’ necessary to 
inter-organisational learning. The flagship is the coordinator/facilitator of learning.  
  Second, the flagship strategy is based on consistent multilateral and 
multidirectional partnerships. Where other studies consider one or two types of 
partners at a time (vertical or horizontal), the flagship strategy stands on the 
interactions of all key business partners. The flagship strategy is also distinct by the 
important role it attributes to non-business infrastructures.  
  Overall, the flagship strategy presents unique configuration traits which can 
help MNEs to internationalise more effectively and efficiently when they lack 
transferable resources to do so, or when they face high environmental pressures in 
host markets. When FDI is risky and difficult, MNEs are advised to coordinate a web 
of key partners in which they act as the strategic centre. 
  Before we turn to the case analysis to determine whether these privileged links 
exist in retail and why, we now introduce the rationale of our case selection and of 
our research methodology.  
TABLE 1 here 
METHODS 
Sample selection  
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Our population of interest is the world’s forty-nine largest retailers in the world's 500 
largest firms.
17  Because our central concern was to pinpoint the existence of different 
causes of flagship network inception, we selected three of these retailers, embedded 
in three different competitive contexts to maximize the probability of capturing 
sufficient variance in the retailers’ network strategies: (i) the retailer's strategic 
position, (ii) the retailer’s level of internationalisation, i.e. its geographic scope and 
(iii) the sectoral/environmental drivers of competition.  
First, the retailer’s strategy and positioning refers to different generic 
strategies competitive strategies and therefore to the unique way the firm creates a 
competitive position in an industry; the way it configures its internal environment 
(resources) to cope with the influence of its external environment; and the way it 
defines its internationalisation goals
18. According to this logic, different interactions 
of economic and environmental forces should help determine the transaction costs 
and resource reasons for choice of network partners by retailers while 
internationalising. We found that while Tesco was competing on a cost-leadership 
strategy driven by a constant growing market share in the U.K. and several other 
European countries
19, LVMH the world’s leading luxury conglomerate was a 
differentiator
20 and The Body Shop (TBS) a focuser on one limited range of products: 
medium-range cosmetics. In Calori and colleagues’ international competitive strategy 
terms adapted by Leknes and Carr for retailing, Tesco was a ‘continental leader’, 
LVMH a ‘global luxury niche player’ and TBS a ‘world-wide specialist’. 
Secondly, the internationalisation scope refers to the MNE’s geographic 
coverage. The international literature has always highlighted the challenges that 
geographic diversification imposes on MNEs in terms of resource transfer, regional 
responsiveness, economic integration, and performance
21. Recent empirical evidence  
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in international business has shown that most of the world's 500 largest MNEs are not 
global but home-region based; very few are bi-regional; and only nine out of the 500 
are global with significant sales in the three regions of the triad
22. More specifically, 
the extent to which a firm crosses the boundaries of its home-region appears to 
increase the necessity to adapt to different market and institutional conditions, (as so 
few large MNEs achieve some global activity). Tesco is very home-region oriented 
(92% of its sales were derived from Europe and 8% from Asia in 2002). TBS is also 
home-region oriented with 53% of its sales in Europe, but it has significant operations 
in the two other regions of the triad (22% in Asia Pacific and 25% in the Americas). 
LVMH is truly global (34% of its sales in Europe, 27% in the United States and 30% 
in Asia Pacific).  
Finally, several sectoral and environmental factors help determine the 
conditions of cross-border transfer of retail firms’ capabilities. In the grocery retail 
segment, national taste; cultural, religious and shopping pattern variations; local 
planning regulations; and the perishability of products impose constraints
23. These 
constraints apply to Tesco. In the luxury retail segment, cross-border differences for 
elitist products and brands are minimal as the same sort of products appeal to the 
global jet set
24. This different set of environmental conditions applies to LVMH and 
affects its internationalisation strategy. In the cosmetic segment there are some 
consumer taste differences and distributional complexities caused by rising cosmetic 
market-share of competing General Merchandise Stores (GMS). Such environmental 
constraints apply to TBS.  
The main differences across the three selected firms, susceptible of triggering 
different causes of flagship network inception, are summarized in Table 2.  
TABLE 2 here  
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Data gathering and analysis 
We used a multi-method data-gathering process. First, to assess whether these three 
retailers have different international networking strategies we conducted pilot 
interviews at senior managerial positions. These first respondents then directed us to a 
series of key partners and to other internal respondents. In total we conducted twenty 
interviews in 2003 at senior managerial levels within the three retailers and across 
their network partners: upstream (private labels and general suppliers), downstream 
(franchisees and concessionaires), selected competitors and non-business institutions 
such as business schools and trade associations. On average, each interview lasted an 
hour, was tape-recorded and transcribed. From the interviews, we inferred a 
hierarchical structure of five nodes and forty seven codes that led to the analysis 
presented below
25. To help reduce any retrospective bias and control for the bias 
present in the interviewer-interviewee relationship
26 we triangulated the different 
interviews with one another across the network and also with both internal and 
secondary sources. This method generated a rich multi-faceted view of the 
phenomenon.  
THE THREE CASES 
In this section, we explore two research questions. First, we consider evidence for the 
existence of flagship network strategies and of their correlation with the three 
retailers’ international success. Second, we examine whether different factors explain 
their network strategies. 
i) Evidence of different levels of flagship-network relations across the three 
retailers 
As summarized in Table 3, the careful selection of cases led to the observation of 
interesting differences in the degree of flagship network strategies coordinated by the  
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three retailers. But according to the retailers, the flagship strategy significantly 
contributes to their current international success.  
  Tesco, the leading British GMS retailer has been the least flagship-oriented of 
the three cases but it increasingly relies on this strategy. In Europe, it has used an FDI 
internalisation strategy to enter Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, the Slovak 
Republic, and Ireland. In Asia, for reasons detailed below, Tesco has increasingly 
relied on partners (joint-ventures) and in the UK it has successfully diversified its 
formats and services with key partners. The estimated proportion of revenues 
generated by these joint activities increased from 3.3% in 2001 to 4.8% in 2002. In 
real value, its estimated partnership-based sales growth (almost 67% in one year 
between 2001 and 2002) outperformed the total group revenues growth (11.3% in the 
same period). Tesco also has key partnerships with branded and private label 
manufacturers. As the supply chain director made clear: ‘We know that we cannot win 
alone. Building partnerships is part of our culture. We value our suppliers and 
service providers as much as our customers’. We also observed important 
collaboration with some non business infrastructures but none with direct 
competitors. Partly due to its flagship strategy, Tesco’s share of international sales 
nearly doubled in five years from 9.8% to 18% of total sales (from 1998 to 2002).  
The nature of these relatively new relationships, summarized in Table 3, which 
confirms the existence of strategic asymmetry in the network, along with the 
importance of non business infrastructures, leads us to define Tesco as an emerging 
flagship.  
 
 LVMH is the world’s leading luxury retailer. Merryl Lynch estimated its 
global market share at 21% in 2001. Its sales were €13,168m in 2002. It is thus three 
times smaller than Tesco. But with brands such as Christian Dior, Louis Vuitton,  
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Moët & Chandon, and Hennessy Cognac, its aura is international. LVMH operates in 
all regions of the triad. The LVMH Fashion Group on which we focused, presents a 
much higher degree of flagship strategy than Tesco especially downstream. This is 
explained by the very high reliance on concession stores in Japanese and American 
department stores. In total, we estimate that 28% of the fashion group's turnover is 
realized through concessions in partnerships, which may have been up to 10% of 
LVMH’s total annual revenues in 2002. This proportion is high and unexpected if one 
considers that LVMH's strategy is often portrayed as relying exclusively on a wholly 
integrated distribution network
27. Upstream, LVMH has reduced its reliance on a 
handful of critical key franchisees which cleverly complement the product offering. 
Like Tesco, LVMH has no alliance or networking relationships with direct 
competitors except through the Comité Colbert, an association which promotes 
French luxury houses’ interests in the world. However, the group has recently started 
a JV with DeBeers for the retail distribution of diamonds. Finally, LVMH actively 
relies on several non-business infrastructures to improve its international 
competitiveness (see Table 3). With this network in place, LVMH is the only Fortune 
500 retailer to have become global. Its international sales even rose from 81 to 83% 
of total sales in 2002. In sum, LVMH is a well-running flagship.  
 
  TBS is the smallest of the three retailers studied here with €563.5 million 
sales revenues in 2002, yet it is the most flagship-network oriented of the three 
retailers. Although TBS’s networking business model has been well documented
28 
our study shows increasing reliance on network ties. Indeed, its model relies on the 
coordination of 1,392 franchises across the world, which generated 64% of the firm’s 
total turnover; 15 key suppliers, which accounted for 95% of the total input/output of 
the firm; and on relationships with the non-business infrastructure, which are critical  
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to support the elasticity of the network and to promote TBS leadership in corporate 
social responsibility. As expected in a flagship strategy, TBS acts as a strategic leader 
for all these partners. But like the two other retailers and at odds with the “ideal” 
flagship strategy, TBS does not cooperate with direct competitors. Its horizontal 
relationships with other retailers are with non-direct competitors. While in 1998 33% 
of its sales were international, this share reached 61% in 2001. This progress is 
explained by a redefinition of its flagship strategy. Indeed, as detailed below, the TBS 
network model has helped the firm to overcome a severe crisis and to turnaround 
from 1999 to 2001. For this reason, we call it a flagship in transition.  
  As developed in the next section, these differences in the degree of flagship 
strategy are explained by diverging causes of flagship network inception. The 
following analysis also helps us to identify converging patterns of flagship relations 
across the retailers which confirm that they follow a flagship strategy, but also traits 
which diverge from the “ideal” flagship strategy, indicating retailing specificities.  
TABLE 3 here 
ii) Evidence of different factors underlying network strategies 
TESCO 
In its race against more internationalised competitors such as Carrefour and Wal-
Mart, Tesco has increasingly relied on network links to sustain its rapid pace of 
internationalisation. According to a recent IGD report, at its current pace of growth, 
Tesco should leapfrog both Metro and Ahold by 2010 in terms of overall sales and its 
international sales should peak at 29% of its total sales.
29 This flagship strategy is 
predominantly influenced by high normative, coercive and isomorphic institutional 
impediments to internationalisation and by the institutional context of transactions in 
both home and host-countries.   
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  Relationships with its external environment significantly influence Tesco’s 
needs for multi-directional cooperation. Different sources of institutional constraints 
force Tesco to become more nationally and socially responsive. Regulatory pressures 
have pushed Tesco into creating joint ventures with Samsung in Korea and with Sime 
Darby Berhard in Malaysia for the development of its retail chain. Invariably, these 
pressures create coercive isomorphism among foreign retailers that are led to adopt 
the same entry and cooperative strategies. In doing so, new entrants choose a key 
partner and start creating local political and supply connections. In Korea, Tesco 
chose Samsung, a prominent actor. As explained by Tesco’s corporate development 
director:  
‘The point of partnering with Samsung is that you are dealing with one of the biggest Korean companies 
which understands the Korean establishment inside out and if you need to get something done, can 
help you to do it: real estate development, creating the right business climate, making sure that sensible 
legislation emerges. It has an influence of all sorts’. She added: ‘‘ In  Korea, it is a massive help on 
the recruitment of head-office people that we are linked to  Samsung because if you are a Korean 
graduate, working for a Samsung joint venture is a great CV thing to do; working for an unknown 
foreign retailer might not be. So it influences the kind of people you can recruit, and it is fundamental. 
The unobvious factor is making sure that you are going to be a place where people want to come and 
work. And there is a kind of social responsibility thing, so you are not a faceless foreigner but you are 
part of a community. We invest in a community in the same ways as we would here’. 
  To further shape this politically acceptable image, in each foreign country, 
Tesco joins local trade associations whose actions are also political and legal. This 
relationship places Tesco as an equally credible player as local competitors in the 
eyes of the government and suppliers. Tesco derives further network synergies since 
Samsung also provides it with the legitimacy to convince local suppliers to organize 
and operate in the Tesco’s way. Tesco literally coaches local suppliers in all domains 
showing high strategy asymmetry: hygiene, lead-time, supply chain management, 
quality controls.... With Samsung behind, suppliers know that Tesco is in Korea for 
the long run; they accept the costs of new investments. As supply quality and 
predictability improve, Tesco and Samsung increase their market grasp.   
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  Upstream, Tesco provides leadership to its whole supply chain, including the 
UK. Complying with strong ethical and financial normative pressures for applying the 
Efficient Consumer Response (ECR) programme of cooperation with suppliers, Tesco 
has gone beyond it in partnership with its key suppliers. Under Tesco’s leadership, for 
example, cooperation has led to the revolutionary “dollies”, an industry innovation 
system of rolling pallets which can be automatically placed into store aisles without 
unloading and loading and which has tremendously increased Tesco’s efficiency. 
Dollies required considerable process innovation by the suppliers which, in return, 
also reduce their costs and achieve a new competitive advantage. These programmes 
(which also include private-label manufacturers such as Geest Plc or McBride) have 
not been without tensions, but both suppliers and Tesco recognize that these tensions 
are sources of innovation and efficiency-enhancement which provide them all with 
superior and exportable competitive advantages. As a senior director of Geest Plc, 
one of Tesco’s leading suppliers of private label fresh and ready meal solutions 
commented:  
‘Tesco ranks us on the ECR score on a business unit basis, not on the overall company basis. 
We do an evaluation on a market by market basis with their buyers. It is a very good two way process 
to understand how things can get better’.  
  
  The data also show that these institutional sources of network orientation are 
in fact subordinated to the economic context of transactions. For example, Tesco is 
careful to foresee the institutional stability that will sustain its contractual relations in 
the alliances before deciding to enter some countries through alliances. Tesco 
carefully monitors other competitors’ entry strategies in so-called risky countries. In 
China, where the joint venture is the entry mode-must, Carrefour’s 2001 troubles 
have made Tesco cautious to enter this market, where it is still absent today. Even if it 
is public knowledge that Tesco will soon enter China, it has taken much more time to  
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check the situation there and establish the safeguards that will minimize its 
transaction risks.  
  As summarized in Table 4, Tesco’s flagship approach is based on strategic 
asymmetry and synergies throughout the network. Downstream and NBI partners 
help to raise its legitimacy in host markets, which convince governments and 
suppliers of its serious economic intentions. This leads to more efficient supply-chain 
relationships and more store opening authorizations which foster Tesco’, Samsung’ 
and their suppliers’ revenues. Here, exogenous, societal and institutional barriers to 
internationalisation play the main role in explaining this flagship strategy. 
 
LVMH 
As shown above, LVMH sustains its global leadership and differentiation strategy 
partially through network ties that selectively complement its internalised strategy. In 
this section, we find other types of internationalisation challenges which explain these 
ties. We also show why, once coordinated, these ties create a flagship network. 
  In contrast to Tesco, LVMH relies much more on external partners. 
Furthermore, it has fewer legitimacy and institutional pressures in foreign countries 
because of the nature and the format of its expansion and because of the particular 
nature of its products which satisfy local consumers’ self-esteem aspirations. Like 
Tesco, the legal institutional context is an important incentive for networking and 
setting privileged links with some partners but unlike Tesco, resource-based factors 
explain why the group opted for a flagship strategy to become global.  
  First, the nature of LVMH’s knowledge and skills affect the risk of key 
capability leakages and its internalisation/de-internalisation choice. LVMH products 
are primary targets of the counterfeiting industry. Consequently, LVMH not only  
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decided to actively cooperate with the Comité Colbert and its other 69 leading French 
luxury members (direct competitors) to pool resources and coordinate a global fight 
but also, in markets where the counterfeiting industry is particularly dangerous, not to 
rely on any licensees. Upstream, in the late 1980s, Christian Dior used to have 300 
licensees across the world. Dior recently downsized this pool into a handful of 40 
privileged licensees (including Christofle or Sàfilo) that it is finally able to follow, 
monitor, support and stimulate. The situation pinpoints a flagship sharing of roles: the 
best practice partners produce what they are good at, but in accordance with LVMH’s 
creative directives and recommendations (strategic asymmetry). Moreover, licensees 
and other LVMH’s distribution partners benefit from LVMH’s cooperation with the 
Comité Colbert to crackdown on counterfeiters since these actions defend its brand 
image and limit falling sales. 
  Second, gaps between the tasks to perform and LVMH’s internal resources are 
drivers of flagship links, since they are sources of interdependence and strategic 
alignment. To reach customers that it could not reach through its own stores, LVMH 
adapts to local retail structures and relies extensively on department-store concessions 
mostly in North America and Japan since these other triad-markets are highly 
department-store driven, contrary to LVMH’s home-region markets. Consider the 
complementarities between LVMH and Selfridges in the UK. On the one hand, 
Selfridges brought a new type of clientele. As Selfridges’ chief buyer explained:  
‘What LVMH people saw is that we were then getting access to customers who had high disposable 
income, who were young and fashionable but who maybe didn’t have the self-confidence, the drive or 
desire to push a very heavy door with a guard in a Bond Street boutique’. 
 
  On the other hand, LVMH contributed to “re-launch” Selfridges:  
 
‘If you had visited Selfridges’ ground floors four years ago [1999], you would have seen brands with 
limited attractiveness in international standards. We have created their ground floor because we came 
in with Vuitton, Dior, Fendi, Céline, Loewe—the  most beautiful brands in the market. Following us, the 
others have invested: Prada, Gucci, Burberrys. Consequently, this has caused a transformation of their 
store because we attracted another level of customers; customers who buy accessories of a certain  
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level will also purchase cosmetics of a certain level, and fashion of a certain level’’-  LVMH Fashion 
Group director United Kingdom 
       
  To promote links with the NBI, LVMH has teamed up with leading academic 
institutions such as ESSEC (where it has been sponsoring the LVMH Chair in 
Management of Luxury Brands since 1991), INSEAD and the London Business 
School on a quasi exclusive basis. These institutions help LVMH to acquire primary 
and applied research before its competitors. The research projects commissioned by 
LVMH on international marketing, brand leadership, consumer behaviour, etc., 
coupled with privileged access to top class human resources, improves LVMH 
strategy and increases its brand value. This improves the overall commercial 
network’s sales and revenues (franchisees, licensees and department stores included).  
  LVMH presents significant evidence of a flagship strategy with multiple 
synergies and strategic asymmetry. This strategy is mostly explained by capabilities 
and resource development barriers to internationalisation combined with opportunism 
minimization concerns (see Table 4). Win-win exchanges explain the long-standing 
and quality aspect of these relationships. This is also why the number of these 
partners must be limited to be properly managed. 
 
THE BODY SHOP 
In contrast with Tesco and most retailers, TBS pioneered and built its reputation on 
corporate social responsibility (CSR). CSR was not an exogenous pressure which 
drove legitimate expansion overseas or at home. It was an internal strategic choice 
directed by its founder who had a new vision of doing business. In contrast with 
LVMH, whose products could generate up to 48% of operating margin, TBS never 
had the resources to build a costly network of concessions within department stores or 
to invest in advertising in the three markets of the triad. TBS illustrates how a modest  
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niche retailer can achieve a high international profile by building flagship ties with a 
number of key partners, while imposing what is now a norm to succeed in the retail 
industry: CSR. It is because the evidence shows that the network is closely articulated 
and multilateral that we call it a flagship. But we found that TBS flagship-based 
expansion has been mainly internally driven. Internationalisation has sharpened 
internal governance choices between internalising and de-internalising, which the 
flagship strategy has helped to solve, while also meeting TBS’s founders’ ideals of 
entrepreneurship and ethical trade. 
 
  To internationalise, TBS opted for a full flagship strategy after considering 
that it would be more economically efficient to rely on long-term relationships based 
on trust with key partners rather than (fully) vertically integrate. This trade-off 
includes multiple elements. As TBS retail director put it for downstream operations:  
‘The main risk TBS has to evaluate is to induce franchisees to invest regularly into the network to keep 
the pace of innovation and competition. Another challenge we take into  account is the over-
development by some head franchisees in some countries where the network is close to saturation, 
with some risks of overexposure of the brand and even internal cannibalization. This can lead us to 
buy-out a franchisee, which is a hidden cost of trust[…] On the benefit side, we assess that key 
partners provide excellent leadership for the brand. They have high profile and exposure in local 
political life. They are high impact people, which is always good to promote the business. They also are 
influential in the press.’ 
 
  In 2000, to show further commitment and enhance trust by increasing 
responsiveness to franchisees TBS changed structure. It has created regional 
headquarters. These centralize supply chain management and decentralize operations 
from the headquarters to shorten lead-times of new product introduction. They also 
enhance multidirectional feedback communications between franchisees, TBS and its 
suppliers, to the benefit of the overall network. Thus, this new structure which 
balances centralisation and decentralisation helps it to strengthen its strategic 
leadership between network partners.  
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  The new structure is also meant to solve the internal governance tensions 
which had gradually developed in the 1990s. Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, 
the weight of the U.S. division had gradually risen to the point of causing 
inefficiencies and management inconsistencies between the U.S. subsidiary and the 
headquarters. For example, it resulted in the proliferation of the number of suppliers 
and in costly overlapping capacities.  
  Besides the changes of relationship with the U.S. subsidiary, in 1999, the 
company opted for renewed flagship ties with fewer, global suppliers. It decided to 
exclusively focus on retailing and to spin-off all its production facilities. It centralised 
its global supply chain, and drastically cut down the number of suppliers; now down 
to fifteen. In this trade-off, TBS calculated that it would become much more 
marketing, cost, and operationally flexible by de-internalising its expensive 
manufacturing capabilities and by relying on trust and long term partnerships with 
some key global suppliers. Recently, missions and reciprocal expectations have been 
clearly and contractually stipulated. However, suppliers are also important for 
innovation. Paradoxically, clear contracts have contributed to enhance trust and 
flexibility between the partners. The key suppliers’ satisfaction and dedication have 
risen because of greater sales following this overall restructuring. TBS conducts over 
half of the R&D efforts and predefines future strategic areas. In 2003, this 
reorganisation around key suppliers had already generated €1.5million savings in the 
supply chain (1% of 2003 turnover; 6% annual decrease of inventory).  
TBS also chose a flagship strategy for the network synergies which help it to 
sustain its CSR leading profile. TBS has pioneered fair trade by asking its suppliers to 
source raw ingredients from forty-two trading business communities in the 
developing world. However, the company also needs to be market-responsive and to  
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follow product life-cycle evolution. In 2001, it needed to terminate six relationships 
with these communities. This would have been ethically very embarrassing if TBS 
had not partnered with its network of NGOs. Working with TBS Oxfam, the Fair 
Trade Consortium, and other NGOS, found alternative customers for these 
communities. Thus, close links with such NBI have maintained the viability of some 
weak suppliers, while enabling TBS to stay market responsive and protect its core 
CSR values. 
  TBS is the most flagship-driven company among the three retailers studied. It 
chose this model to overcome the costly governance consequences of 
internationalisation. It also shows clear evidence of strategic leadership in seeking to 
coordinate resources and flexibility for the benefit of the overall network (Table 4). 
 
Besides highlighting clear flagship patterns based on multidirectional network 
synergies, strategic asymmetry, and the role of NBIs, the case analysis discloses some 
variations with the “ideal” flagship strategy framework. It underscores two weak 
types of flagship relationships.  
(i) Downstream, ‘key customers’ are in effect other retailers which are often potential 
competitors at the same time. They can perform the operations in lieu of the retailer. 
In Tesco’s case, the two conglomerates—Samsung in Korea and Sam Darby Berhad 
in Malaysia—are also big retailers. For LVMH key department store partners are also 
possible rivals. When LVMH launched Sephora in the United States and Japan, it 
clashed with its key department store partners there. Ultimately, Sephora pulled out of 
Japan, partly to retain these good relationships. Some of TBS’s retail partners are not 
always ‘typical’ key customers either but potential competitors. This is the case of  
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AEON/JUSCO in Japan which was the world’s 196
th largest firm in 2002 and fifty 
times larger than TBS. These are risks to manage. 
(ii) Direct alliances with competitors are rare. Alliances take place with other small or 
large multinationals, specialized in specific services. They facilitate diversification 
but avoid domain overlaps. Thus, this research confirms previous studies on the 
extreme competitiveness and anti-cooperative attitude in retailing, especially in the 
grocery segment
30. At the same time, it contributes to contextualise the original 
flagship strategy framework. 
 
LINKING FLAGSHIP THEORY TO THE FSA/CSA MATRIX 
The previous section shows that when network-based strategies are chosen by 
retailers to internationalise, they emerge for different reasons. In this section, we go 
further in this direction by showing that these apparently heterogeneous sets of causal 
factors can be organized in an orderly way. We show that the conditions of flagship-
network inceptions in turn depend on a retailer’s firm-specific advantages (FSA) and 
country-specific advantages (CSA). Thus, our research uncovers the link between the 
flagship network theory and a classic international business strategy framework: the 
FSA/CSA framework.   
The FSAs are the strengths of a firm as a result of its brand name, personnel, 
capital, innovation and technological capabilities. In international business 
vocabulary, FSAs are the same as the rare, valuable and non-imitable capabilities of 
strategic management,
31 but they predate the latter. FSAs are considered strong when 
they are superior to those of rivals. With GMS retailers who are disadvantaged in this 
respect compared to life-style retailers, there is poor cross-border transferability of 
FSAs (highly location-bound). The former have difficulties in realizing the desired  
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economies of scale to compete on costs and scale compared to the latter. The 
transferability of resources (not the absolute value of knowledge and capabilities 
possessed by a firm in its country of origin) can be called the geographic reach of 
FSAs.  
In contrast, the CSAs are the location-bound, exogenous factors in an MNE’s 
home-market. The CSAs result from the home country’s economic and institutional 
environments (labour force, factor endowments, government policies, national 
culture, productive reputation, institutional framework) or from the share of the home 
market in the MNE’s FSA deployment.  
The resulting Figure 2 is an international strategy matrix. We will now 
position the three firms in this matrix based on our interviews and analysis. However, 
our strategic positioning, dealing with the international aspects of the FSAs, and with 
CSAs, should not be confused with positioning using financial performance 
measures. The latter are reviewed in Table 5. This shows that Tesco leads in most 
overall performance categories, but we have found that it has had relatively more 
difficulties to transfer its FSAs internationally than the two other retailers, as we now 
discuss. 
  When starting up in a foreign country and the more remote this country is (for 
instance the Asian countries), Tesco does not enter with a well-known brand name 
which places it at an advantage with local competitors. Its liability of foreignness is 
high and it needs to adapt considerably its marketing and different elements of its 
value-chain to local conditions. The conditions of resource transferability from the 
home-to the host markets are difficult. For these reasons, the geographic reach of 
Tesco’s FSAs is weak. However, its successful cost-leadership which has knocked off 
the former British leader Sainsbury gives Tesco a very strong and cash wealthy  
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home-base. Tesco has strong CSAs. Thus, Tesco is placed in quadrant 1 of the Figure 
2 matrix. For the reasons already explained the nature of Tesco’operations makes it 
more prone to institutional challenges and thus to operational adaptations when going 
overseas than LVMH or TBS. Thus, if we link the factors previously developed with 
each retailer’s competitive position we find that in spite of its wealth generated by its 
powerful position in its home-market (strong CSA), Tesco cannot easily transfer its 
FSA (its privileged internalised operating patterns and its brand name) across borders 
because these FSA components are too UK location-bound to overcome institutional 
impediments in host-countries This is why we found that the prevailing factors 
leading Tesco to adopt a flagship strategy were mostly country-based (strong in CSA, 
low in FSA). 
  With its global and prestigious brand-portfolio, LVMH can push forward a 
universally praised product universe with minimal adaptation (strong non location-
bound FSAs) and exploit the universal prestige of the French savoir-faire for luxury 
goods (strong CSAs). LVMH enjoys an ideal strategic competitive position. It is 
placed in quadrant 3 of Figure 2 matrix. To complement its existing resources with 
upstream and downstream partnerships, it needs to make sure first of the institutional 
feasibility of these arrangements (mostly contractual) and second of the feasibility of 
long-term strategic interdependent relations. These factors are both firm-based and 
country-based (high in both FSA and CSA)  
In 1997, an Interbrand global survey ranked TBS the 28
th world top brand. 
Clearly, TBS has strong non location-bound FSAs, especially marketing-based. 
However, unlike LVMH with France, TBS does not rely on a ‘made in the U.K.’ 
advantage. Unlike Tesco whose 82% of sales are generated in the U.K., TBS home-
country accounted for no more than 39%. In other words, TBS had weak CSAs. TBS  
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is placed in quadrant 4 of Figure 2 matrix. Thus, to compensate for this weakness, 
TBS has to strengthen the global reach of the FSA, e.g. its marketing advantages, 
while placing a special emphasis on its cost control. It can do so by adopting a 
focused strategy based on network interactions. Therefore, the factors that matter are 
firm-based (high in FSA and low in CSA).  
FIGURE 2 here 
In addition to the new links established between the two strategic frameworks 
and the evidence of some weak flagship by contrast with the “ideal” flagship strategy 
framework, we find that the contingencies explaining flagship network inception have 
clear identifiable roots in the general management, organisation theory, strategic 
management and international business literatures. Indeed, these contingencies are 
clearly rooted in transaction costs economics, institutional theory, and the resource-
based view of the firm. Thus, research in retailing is perfectly compatible with these 
theories, contrary to what certain retail scholars argue
32. The analytical lenses used in 
this paper and the contributions to the academic literature are synthesized in Table 6. 
TABLES  5 and 6 here 
STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS   
Bearing in mind the small number of cases studied, which is a possible limitation to 
this research, we now turn to the main managerial implications of the findings. We 
draw recommendations for both flagship MNE managers and network partner 
managers. 
(i) Choose a de-internalised international expansion path based on your initial 
competitive advantage position. In international business terms, this position is the 
product of the retailer’s combined FSAs (most importantly of its international brand 
name) and CSAs (its home-country competitiveness) as shown in the matrix of  
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Figure 2. This framing helps the retailer to determine its most likely sources of 
barriers to internationalisation, and to decide upon its entry-mode, internalising/de-
internalising governance, and choice of partners.  
First, when its brand name is unknown abroad (weak FSA) but when it has 
strong leadership in its home-market (strong CSAs, quadrant 1 situation), the retailer 
will predominantly choose a flagship strategy if it needs to develop a high profile and 
adapt its value chain to institutional contingencies (economic, legal, isomorphic). If 
this is the case, active cooperation with suppliers and non-business institutions such 
as host governments and trade associations will be crucial to becoming nationally 
responsive and economically efficient. In contrast, an internalised strategy is needed 
when contracts and property right enforcement regimes are too weak to control for 
external opportunism.  
Second, when a retailer’s brand name and CSAs are both strong, i.e. when it 
has a quadrant 3 mix, the retailer is indifferent between an internalised or a de-
internalised strategy. The retailer can choose or adopt both. But if it aims to become 
global, as opposed to staying regional or local, it will hardly achieve sourcing or 
distribution economies of scale on a ‘go-it-alone’ basis. Therefore, the retailer will 
opt for a flagship mainly to complement rather than substitute for its internal growth. 
This choice will be led by some strategic factors: avoid key knowledge leakage, and 
reduce the risks or capital exposure by leveraging external parties’ capabilities and 
resources if some complementarities and interdependencies with existing players are 
worth pursuing. In crafting this flagship strategy, the decision-maker will mostly 
concentrate efforts on partners that enhance the retail network scale (downstream 
partners).   
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  Third, when the retailer starts internationalising with modest CSAs, its 
purpose will be to compensate this weakness by developing stronger FSAs such as 
excellent marketing skills. In this quadrant 4 situation, it will likely opt for a flagship 
strategy if the trade-off between an internalised expansion through M&A or organic 
growth (which requires not only high resources but also favourable incentives and 
asset complementarities
33) and the costs incurred to build trust with possible partners 
leans in favour of the latter. When it is cheaper to build trust, the manager will 
evaluate which resources and which partners to prioritize. 
(ii)  In the flagship network, create synergies between all key partners. This 
point is essential to create trust since it is by facilitating synergistic benefits that 
flagship MNE managers show and stimulate commitment to and from all partners. In 
assessing which kind of partners the firm should prioritize, the retailer should be 
careful to avoid two pitfalls. First, it should avoid excessive alliances. These networks 
are carefully built over time and going too fast makes the whole construction fragile. 
The three case studies demonstrated that the number of key partners must be very 
limited. Each partnership requires time, good communication, monitoring and bi-
lateral investments to nurture trust. Second, once there is a focus on one group or 
partners, the retailer should not neglect to create links with other types of partners. 
NBI turned out to be very important, yet it is too often neglected in the firms’ 
strategy. Indeed, in flagship networks, each group of partners creates synergies for the 
whole to become more than the sum of its parts. One NBI partnership can have an 
impact on the cohesion with the other partners. So it is not merely one type or 
direction of linkages but rather a very complex web of relationships which sustains 
the retailers’ internationalisation and competitiveness through positive synergies.   
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  Reciprocally, network partner managers will seek to play a proactive role vis à 
vis the flagship and even other network partners. By showing commitment, by 
providing market intelligence and by constantly renewing their capabilities, they are 
essential to help the flagship construct the overall strategic vision. 
(iii)  Give time to go international. LVMH and TBS seem to be two outliers in 
the international retail industry. Very few retailers are global or even semi-global. 
Perhaps other GMS retailers will move from quadrant 1 to quadrant 3 and 
internationalise further, for instance by becoming at least bi-regional actors. As their 
international life-cycle matures, they will need partners more for strategic than 
institutional reasons, which was a cycle experienced by LVMH in the late 1980s to 
the early 1990s. As their brands and operational practices become more familiar, they 
will face fewer institutional pressures. It is striking that Tesco is still at an early stage 
of its internationalisation compared to LVMH and TBS. The implication is that there 
are life-cycle dynamics underlying a flagship strategy and the manager ought to be 
alert to changing operational conditions with the passage of time.  
  These managerial implications are synthesized in Table 7.  
TABLE 7 here 
CONCLUSIONS  
The study has highlighted the value of the flagship strategy to overcome firm-specific 
and exogenous barriers to internationalisation. In so doing, it supports a growing body 
of international business literature emphasizing the gradual opening of MNEs’ 
boundaries across borders with an increasing network-form of organisation and 
structure.
34  Traditionally, the literature has emphasised the role of trust to enter 
cooperative relationships. Our research suggests that trust often comes second to  
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contracts. Good relationships will necessarily evolve beyond contracts but managers 
should not be afraid to develop contracts. 
  Second, since there is a constant trade-off between endogenous and 
exogenous pressures on a retailer, we do not suggest that flagship strategy is a 
universal panacea. Indeed, we note several associated risks. One risk is complacency. 
Flagship MNEs cannot tolerate inter-partner complacency and when they fall into this 
trap (which was the case to some extent at TBS in the late 1990s before their 
restructuring), they risk failure. The flagship MNE provides guidance, assistance, 
long-term vision and business stability for its partners to invest and improve their 
skills. These partners must be prepared to face pressure on their route to excellence 
caused by the new challenges imposed by their leading MNE. Partners must deliver 
operational benefits in return for membership in a valuable network. Thus, the 
flagship strategy is based on demanding partner relationships. Partners may also run a 
‘locked-in’ risk. A difficult challenge is to build relationships for the long-term while 
avoiding being locked into undesirable strategic positions. This may require enlarging 
the network, confirmed diplomatic skills, and the periodic changing of the network.  
  Third, the flagship strategy is an important but not the only path of successful 
internationalisation in retailing. Finding a broader set of institutional factors usefully 
complements transaction costs economics, and indicates that property rights are 
important factors in the strategic choices undertaken by retail managers. When it is 
not possible to develop flagship relationships, there is a rationale for internalising. 
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TABLE 1 – FLAGSHIP STRATEGY IN CONTEXT 
 







































Scope                
International Management, 
foreign entries(with focal firm) 
X              
International Management 
(multiple firms, intra- industry 
level) 
 X  X             
Strategic Management (SM): 
innovation, flexibility, risk-
sharing, long-term cooperation 
X  X  X X X X  X   
SM with focal firm  X     X           
Intra-organisational only          X      
Inter-personal               X  
Network structure (ties, 
positioning) 
           X   x  
Knowledge-sharing  X  X  X X X X  X  X  X 
                
Configuration                
One strategic centre  X     X           
Vertical partners  X  X  X X X X  X  X  X 
Horizontal partners  X X X  X  X    X X X 
Non-business infrastructures  X              
Emphasis on multidirectional 
synergies 
X        X       
                
Governance                
Strategic asymmetry  X              
Strategic symmetry     X     X     
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  TESCO  LOUIS VUITTON MOET 
HENNESSY 
THE BODY SHOP 
     
1) Size (in sales revenues; € 
m, 2002) 
39, 200* 
(25.8% grocery market 
share in the UK)** 
13,168 
(21% global market share in 
2001***) 
564 
     
2) Sampling criteria     
Degree of internationalisation 
(% of total sales in 2002) 
18 83 66 
      
Degree of regionalization (% 
of total sales in 2002) 
      Europe 
      NAFTA 




   0 











      
International strategy 
(Rugman & Girod 2003) 
Home-region player  Global actor  Quasi bi-regional actor 
      
Competitive strategy (Porter 
1980, Calori, et al, 2000; 
Leknes & Carr, 2004) 
Cost leader and 
“continental leader” 
Differentiator and “Global 
luxury niche player” 
Focuser and “worldwide 
specialist” 
 
* Note: Tesco’s fiscal year closes on February 22. For comparability reasons with the two other retailers and since most of 
fiscal year 2003 reflects 2002 operations, we refer to 2002 for Tesco as well. 
** Tesco Account Watch, 2003, Institute of Grocery Distribution (IGD) 
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TABLE 3 – DIFFERENT DEGREE OF FLAGSHIP STRATEGY 
 
  TESCO 
“The emergent flagship” 
LVMH 
“The smoothly-running flagship” 
THE BODY SHOP 
“The flagship in transition” 
































Growth model primarily based on internalisation 
(acquisitions and greenfield growth in continental 
Europe).  
 
- Flagship links mostly in Asia where 
internalisation is difficult; in Korea with 
Samsung, in Thailand (and the UK) with Exxon 
for Tesco Express, and in Malaysia with Sam 
Darby Berhad. 
- Estimated partnership-based sales revenues 
accounted for 4.8% of total sales in 2002. 
- While Tesco’s total sales growth was 11% 
between 2001 and 2002, partnership-based 




10 key private label manufacturers (e.g. Geest, 
MCBride) and 20 national branded good 
suppliers increasingly important for Tesco’s cost 





No alliances with direct competitors but JV with 
the Royal Bank of Scotland (Tesco Personal 
Finance) and with O2 (Tesco cell phones) 
 
 
Local trade associations 
 
Î Modest but growing flagship links 




- Flagship links have helped LVMH to 
become global: access to major department 
stores’ customer base in North America 
and Japan (e.g. Saks, Takashimaya, 
Selfridges…). 
- For Vuitton, Dior and Givenchy 47% of 
stores were concessions within department 
stores in Japan and 51% in the USA. 
- Estimated partnership-based sales 
revenues accounted for 28% of the fashion 
group’s sales and 10% of total LVMH sales 
in 2002 (double of Tesco’s). 
 
40 key selected licensees or suppliers are in 
charge of the design and manufacturing of 
technical products where LVMH/Dior does 
not have core competences (E.g., Christofle 




No alliance with direct competitors but JV 




Comité Colbert,  LVMH chair at ESSEC, 
INSEAD, London Business School. 
 
Î Strong and stable flagship links 
TBS fully restructured its operations in 
1999 and 2000. The new growth model is 
fully based on flagship network links. 
 
Key role of franchisees (1,392 in 2002): 
they accounted for 64% of total group 
sales (more than 12 times Tesco’s and 










- TBS’ s exit  from any manufacturing 
activities in 2000 consolidated the role 
of 15 key suppliers that account for 95% 
of TBS’s total input (e.g. Cosi). 
- Reduction of 13% in the number of 
trading communities in the developing 
world between 2001 and 2002. 
 





Non-governmental institutions (Oxfam; 
Fair Trade Consortium) 
Î Increasing and stronger flagship links  
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TABLE 4 – RETAILERS’ FLAGSHIP STRATEGIES 
  TESCO  LOUIS VUITTON MOET HENNESSY  THE BODY SHOP 
Flagship strategy contribution to 
internationalisation 
Between 1999  and 2002 (Tesco entry in 
Asia and launch of Tesco Express 
format), the share of international sales in 
total sales has jumped from 9.8% to 18% 
LVMH is the only global retailer among 
Fortune 500 retailers 
New market entries, new network 
repositioning and innovation have 
boosted international sales from 33% of 
total sales in 1998 to 61% 
     
Causes of inception 
Different internal and external barriers to 
internationalisation to overcome 
- Legitimacy and status enhancement 
- Structure or transaction context 
- Property right enforcement regimes 
 
- Nature of capabilities and knowledge 
- Resource gap and dependency 
- Strategic interdependence 
- MNE’s structure 
- Governance costs trade-offs 
- Corporate Social Responsibility 
     
Key  flagship features for success     
Main observed network synergies  - From downstream partners to Tesco, 
suppliers and government 
- From trade associations to Tesco, 
suppliers and the government 
- From business schools to LVMH and 
downstream partners, suppliers and 
franchisees 
-  From NGOs to trade community 
suppliers 
-  From franchisees to suppliers via TBS 
- TBS is moving toward a more upscale 
brand positioning. Learning from AEON 
operations in Japan have been 
important. Repositioning led by TBS 
elsewhere in the network 
Most influential non business 
infrastructures 
Local trade associations  Business schools for applied research 
and human resource supply 
Non-governmental organisations 
Strategic asymmetry  - In Asia, Tesco keeps running all 
operations. Samsung provides political 
clout. 
- Leadership in innovation and new 
market exploration; suppliers specialize 
in cost improvements and quality 
enhancement 
- Coaching of suppliers in emerging 
markets of Europe and Asia 
- Coordination of a very limited number of 
franchisees specialized in highly 
creative and high quality fashion goods. 
But LVMH provides market guidance 
and collection orientation. 
- LVMH leads the research agenda with 
business schools. They lead the 
teaching 
- TBS conducts the bulk of R&D and 
provides future market guidance to 
suppliers. 
- TBS innovates, launched new products, 
coordinate local and regional marketing; 
local head franchisees help in PR, store 
location and investment. 
- TBS coordinates overall repositioning 
    
Observed deviation from flagship 
strategy framework 
-  Downstream some key partners can become potential competitors (large local retailers such as Samsung or Sam Darby 
Berhad) 
-  No partnerships with direct competitors 
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Performance Ratios  Tesco  LVMH  The Body Shop 
Return on capital employed- Latest 5 
years average (%) 
11.5 5.8  10.0 
Return on sales- Latest 5 years average 
(%) 
5.6 10.2  3.8 
Sales growth over last 5 years (% pa)  80  72  25 
Share price increase over last 10 years 
(%)  
+23 -8  +17 
Overseas sales in percentage of latest 
published figures (2003) 
19.7 83  77  
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•  The flagship strategy is a viable strategy of internationalisation and foreign 
operations management for multinational retailers. This confirms previous studies 
on the current trend in boundaries opening among multinational enterprises. 
 
•  However, in contrast with the “ideal” flagship strategy framework, the specificities 
of this industry lead to uncover weak flagship relations. This makes the 
framework more contextual. 
 
•  The FSA/CSA international management framework is found to be useful to 
explain the causes of flagship network inceptions. The causes of network 
inception are not serendipitous. This has important managerial implications for 
the trade-off between a choice of internalisation or partnership strategies.  
 
•  Contrary to what is sometimes read in the academic literature on retailing, the 
analysis confirms the relevance of several main stream theories to explain 
network inceptions: these theories are transaction costs economics, the 
resource-based view of the firm, institutional and contingency theories. 
 
•  Contingency and institutional factors where not present in Rugman and D’Cruz’s 
flagship framework. This research shows that the sources of theories which 





FURTHER RESEARCH  
 
•  This research is exploratory only. Larger scale confirmatory research needed 
within the three retail segments studied to check the consistency of patterns of 
flagship network inception as predicted by the FSA/CSA framework. 
 
•  If larger scale studies identify clusters of retailers with similar FSA/CSA 
configurations, will we find the same degree of reliance on flagship network 
strategy? This research is based on an assumption of managerial intentionality 
seeking economic efficiency maximisation. Theory explains that other rationales 
explain managerial behaviour. So which other factors will explain the differences: 
path-dependency, internal politics, opportunity, etc.? 
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TABLE 7 – LESSONS FOR MANAGERS 
 
 
•  In addition to being a useful strategy to manage long-term network cooperation, the flagship strategy is useful to 
overcome different internal and exogenous barriers to internationalisation. 
 
For flagship MNE managers 
 
•  Choose your internationalisation strategy (trade off between internalisation and de-internalisation) in function of 
your initial competitive position (determined by the FSA/CSA combination). 
 
•  Consider contracting; although they are not compulsory, good relationships can be managed contractually at 
first; with time you will make them evolve to fully trust-based relationships. We find that contracts are an 
important first step towards trust creation. 
  
•  Create trust by showing commitments to all network partners and by constructing effective network synergies for 
the benefit of all partners.  
 
•  Select a very limited number of partners. The flagship MNE cannot disperse its time and energy in supervising 
and providing impetus to a host of partners. 
 
•  Select your partners on the basis of the complementarities they offer to the flagship and on the 
complementarities and synergies that they can build with one another. 
 
•  Do not confound strategic asymmetry with tyranny: remain open to sharing of ideas and prospects; they are 
source of opportunities for innovation. 
 
•  Don’t forget non-business infrastructures 
 
•  Anticipate the risks: avoid complacency, don’t remain locked into undesirable strategic positions; renew or 
enlarge the network. With the passage of time, as your FSA evolve,  you will need new partners matching your 
new requirements. 
 
For other network partner managers 
 
•  Constantly improve and renew your capabilities. 
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NON BUSINESS INFRASTRUCTURES 
 
Universities, trade associations,    Governments 






Key :  
 
Commercial relationships (price-
based)   
 
Network linkages 
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